Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- 1 November 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Mathematical and Computer Modelling
- Vol. 48 (9-10), 1357-1373
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.031
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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