Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas

Abstract

The unprecedented losses from Hurricane Katrina can be explained by two paradoxes. The safe development paradox is that in trying to make hazardous areas safer, the federal government in fact substantially increased the potential for catastrophic property damages and economic loss. The local government paradox is that while their citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, local officials pay insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability. The author demonstrates in this article that in spite of the two paradoxes, disaster losses can be blunted if local governments prepare comprehensive plans that pay attention to hazard mitigation. The federal government can take steps to increase local government commitment to planning and hazard mitigation by making relatively small adjustments to the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and the Flood Insurance Act. To be more certain of reducing disaster losses, however, the author suggests that we need a major reorientation of the National Flood Insurance Program from insuring individuals to insuring communities.