Environmental risks and bank liability
- 1 August 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in European Economic Review
- Vol. 41 (8), 1427-1459
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(96)00034-7
Abstract
No abstract availableOther Versions
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