The Nature of Conceptual Similarity Schemata: Examination of Some Basic Assumptions

Abstract

The systematic distortion hypothesis and related formulations, such as implicit personality, illusory correlation, and stereotyping, posit bias in patterns of rating covariation that parallel raters' implicit conceptual similarity (CS) schemata. Support for these distortion processes has been construed as substantiating strong assumptions about the nature of CS schemata. It has been asserted (a) that CS is a normative schema and (b) that the CS schema is not reflective of true covariation. Recent research examining distortion processes in the domain of behavior-based performance ratings has identified boundary conditions that challenge the strong assumptions. CS schemata are conceptualized as (a) varying over individuals and (b) sensitive to true behavioral covariation. The present research examined these sets of assumptions using naturally occurring observation and actual behavioral covariation. Study I concluded that the moderate consensus evidenced in the structure of CS schemata indicated that CS was an individual-level not normative, attribute. Study 2 concluded that the relationship shown between conceptual domain knowledge and CS-true score covariation indicated that CS schemata are sensitive to observed behavioral covariation. Implications for rater judgment are discussed.