The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy
- 1 July 2001
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 15 (3), 377-411
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00143
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
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- International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissionsEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 1992
- THE PROBLEM OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONOxford Review of Economic Policy, 1990
- Renegotiation in repeated gamesGames and Economic Behavior, 1989