Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, nash and the secret handshake
- 1 June 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 144 (3), 379-396
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80082-7
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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