Performance Measures and Democracy: Information Effects on Citizens in Field and Laboratory Experiments

Abstract

There has been a massive expansion in published information about the performance of bodies delivering public services but little research about the effects on citizens. Research on information and political participation suggests that information cues allow citizens to economize on the need for full information, influencing their perceptions and attitudes and helping them hold democratic governments to account. This article uses field and laboratory experiments with random allocation to citizens of information cues about local government performance to evaluate their effects. It finds that a cue about relatively good performance raises citizens’ perceived performance and satisfaction and a cue about relatively bad performance lowers perceived performance and satisfaction. Direct effects on citizens’ intention to vote for the local incumbent are not evident and the cue about good performance is more influential on the perceptions and satisfaction of citizens who already supported the incumbent. However, overall, the findings suggest that public performance information systems can be credible to citizens. Future research should assess the effects of different forms of performance information in different service contexts coming from different information sources, with the sources potentially varying in credibility to citizens.