Power Analysis Attacks of Modular Exponentiation in Smartcards
- 1 January 1999
- book chapter
- conference paper
- Published by Springer Science and Business Media LLC in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 144-157
- https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48059-5_14
Abstract
Three new types of power analysis attacks against smartcard implementations of modular exponentiation algorithms are described. The first attack requires an adversary to exponentiate many random messages with a known and a secret exponent. The second attack assumes that the adversary can make the smartcard exponentiate using exponents of his own choosing. The last attack assumes the adversary knows the modulus and the exponentiation algorithm being used in the hardware. Experiments show that these attacks are successful. Potential countermeasures are suggested.This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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