Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence
Top Cited Papers
- 17 July 2015
- journal article
- review article
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 349 (6245), 267-272
- https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa8403
Abstract
The field of artificial intelligence (AI) strives to build rational agents capable of perceiving the world around them and taking actions to advance specified goals. Put another way, AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating this new species of machine, machina economicus, and discuss some challenges in designing AIs that can reason effectively in economic contexts. Supposing that AI succeeds in this quest, or at least comes close enough that it is useful to think about AIs in rationalistic terms, we ask how to design the rules of interaction in multi-agent systems that come to represent an economy of AIs. Theories of normative design from economics may prove more relevant for artificial agents than human agents, with AIs that better respect idealized assumptions of rationality than people, interacting through novel rules and incentive systems quite distinct from those tailored for people.This publication has 43 references indexed in Scilit:
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