Engineering H5N1 avian influenza viruses to study human adaptation

Abstract

Engineering influenza viruses to study human adaptation is a controversial area of research, with opinions diverging over the wisdom of publishing the full results of such studies. The importance and public-safety implications of two papers describing the production of ferret-transmissible H5N1 influenza viruses, one published in Nature and one in Science, have divided opinion among researchers and policy-makers. In this Perspective, David Morens, Kanta Subbarao and Jeffery Taubenberger review the scientific basis of assumptions underlying the decisions by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity — first to postpone the publication of redacted papers, and then to recommended the publication of more complete manuscripts. When considering the threat of bioterrorism or accidental release of genetically engineered viruses, the authors point out that nature is the ultimate bioterrorist. To prepare for the possibility of future devastating influenza pandemics, the crucial importance of advancing scientific knowledge needs to be kept front and centre. Two studies of H5N1 avian influenza viruses that had been genetically engineered to render them transmissible between ferrets have proved highly controversial. Divergent opinions exist about the importance of these studies of influenza transmission and about potential ‘dual use’ research implications. No consensus has developed yet about how to balance these concerns. After not recommending immediate full publication of earlier, less complete versions of the studies, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity subsequently recommended full publication of more complete manuscripts; however, controversy about this and similar research remains.