The Devolution Revolution in Intergovernmental Relations in the 1990s: Changes in Cooperative and Coercive State-National Relations as Perceived by State Administrators

Abstract

The “devolution revolution” was a central issue in American intergovernmental relations in the 1990s. Judgments about the outcomes of intergovernmental policy changes varied among scholars of American federalism. Some argued that intergovernmental relations shifted substantially in the direction of devolution toward the states in the 1990s. Others were skeptical about the existence or degree of devolution during the decade. This essay examines shifts in state–national relations during the 1990s. The research centers on national fiscal and regulatory influence on the states. Data from the 1994 and 1998 American State Administrators Project surveys were used to measure state agency heads' perceptions of national influence on state governments and administrative agencies. Confirmatory factor analysis was employed to confirm the finding that perceived national fiscal and regulatory influences changed in the 1990s. There was an identifiable and distinct decline in the aggregate and average levels of national fiscal and regulatory influence from 1994 to 1998. Just as national influence accrued gradually across prior decades, it appeared to decline gradually in the 1990s. The shift was more an evolution than a revolution. Additionally, there was a clear and noteworthy shift toward convergence in perceptions of national fiscal and regulatory influence. This empirical finding lends credence to the “coercive cooperation” phrase coined by Elazar to describe the changes of state–national relations near the end of the twentieth century. For practicing public administrators one central finding emerges from this analysis. The turbulent waters of intergovernmental management have become increasingly murky. The blending of fiscally based cooperation with regulatory-related conflict (or coercion) calls for greatly enhanced management skills.