Cryptography from Noisy Storage
- 5 June 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Letters
- Vol. 100 (22), 220502
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physrevlett.100.220502
Abstract
We show how to implement cryptographic primitives based on the realistic assumption that quantum storage of qubits is noisy. We thereby consider individual-storage attacks; i.e., the dishonest party attempts to store each incoming qubit separately. Our model is similar to the model of bounded-quantum storage; however, we consider an explicit noise model inspired by present-day technology. To illustrate the power of this new model, we show that a protocol for oblivious transfer is secure for any amount of quantum-storage noise, as long as honest players can perform perfect quantum operations. Our model also allows us to show the security of protocols that cope with noise in the operations of the honest players and achieve more advanced tasks such as secure identification.Keywords
Other Versions
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Cryptography in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage ModelSIAM Journal on Computing, 2008
- Security of Quantum Bit String Commitment Depends on the Information MeasurePhysical Review Letters, 2006
- Quantum cryptographyReviews of Modern Physics, 2002
- A scheme for efficient quantum computation with linear opticsNature, 2001
- Insecurity of quantum secure computationsPhysical Review A, 1997
- Unconditionally Secure Quantum Bit Commitment is ImpossiblePhysical Review Letters, 1997
- Is Quantum Bit Commitment Really Possible?Physical Review Letters, 1997
- A randomized protocol for signing contractsCommunications of the ACM, 1985
- Conjugate codingACM SIGACT News, 1983
- Universal classes of hash functionsJournal of Computer and System Sciences, 1979