Nonviolence and the case of the extremely ruthless opponent∗

Abstract

A common criticism of nonviolent action is its ineffectiveness against an extremely ruthless ruler. In this article I attempt to examine critically, both in terms of a theory of power and the empirical evidence, this standard view of nonviolence's limitation. Are the critics, it is asked, posing the right question in assessing whether or not nonviolence ‘works'? If not, in place of the ruthlessness factor, is there any question or series of questions highlighting other factors that might prove cogently sound in predicting the outcome of a nonviolent strategy? My investigation discloses that questions about the establishment of a dependency relationship ‐ based on either the opponent's self interest or his/her sense of ‘self in the other’ ‐ are the crucial ones to address in order to determine the efficacy of nonviolence. The outer limits of nonviolent action are not set by brutal tyrants, as realists would maintain. Despite the difficulties (which should not be minimised), a nonviolent strategy can be devised and succeed against the cruellest of oppressors. It is doomed to failure, however, if a dependency interest or ‘co‐human’ relationship cannot be established, either directly or through third parties.