Abstract
Conducted 2 experiments with a total of 100 male undergraduates in a laboratory bargaining simulation to investigate 3 hypotheses about the effect of 1 bargainer's concessions on the concessions of the opposing bargainer. Results indicate that Ss conceded more when the programed opponent made small concessions than when the opponent made large concessions (Exp I). The effect of the opponent's concessions on S's concessions appeared to be mediated by S's aspiration level. S's aspiration level, concessions, and perception of the opponent's strength were affected by the degree of time pressure (Ss were limited to 5-8 offers) and the S's knowledge of the opponent's payoffs as well as by the opponent's offers (Exp II). Discrepancies with previous studies are discussed. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)