The Independence of Central Bank: Concept, Methods and Impact of Global Financial Crisis
- 1 January 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Journal of New Economic Association in Journal of the New Economic Association
- Vol. 40 (4), 110-136
- https://doi.org/10.31737/2221-2264-2018-40-4-5
Abstract
The theory of independence of central banks was developed during the 1980s and 1990s. Central banks went from private joint-stock company to public entity with special legal status in the long-term. Today the topic of independence is one of the most popular in the political economy. In the 2010s, researches moved in two directions: the impact of independence on sovereign debt management and the role of democratic regimes. The disinflationary effects of independence are confirmed; moreover, independence minimizes the impact of the political cycle on inflation. Under the super-authoritarian political regimes such effects are not observed. The recent financial crisis 2007-2009 has changed the role of central banks as a result of non-conventional monetary and macro-prudential policy measures. The independence of the central bank was influenced by a complex of problems of the financial and fiscal systems. Recent research doesn't suggest that independence of central bank has been reduced. However the recent financial crisis shed light on shortcomings of central banks independence theory. It includes departure from the political independence, overlapping of functions and defects of legal independence indexes. Today the theory is facing the task of rethinking the factors of independence and developing new methods for its estimate, taking into account the expanded powers of central banks.Keywords
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