Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks
- 30 November 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 54 (8), 2205-2230
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.07.005
Abstract
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