ELECTORAL POLITICS AND THE EXECUTIVE VETO: A PREDICTIVE THEORY
- 1 July 1995
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 33 (3), 427-440
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01872.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Probability of Being PresidentThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1993
- Presidential Commitment and the VetoAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1991
- Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939The Journal of Law and Economics, 1991
- Congressional Influence on BureaucracyJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1990
- A Theory of Political Control and Agency DiscretionAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1989
- Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibriumPublic Choice, 1987
- Appropriations Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game between President and CongressLegislative Studies Quarterly, 1985
- When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto LegislationThe Journal of Politics, 1983
- Campaign Resource Allocations Under the Electoral CollegeAmerican Political Science Review, 1975
- The 3/2's Rule in Presidential CampaigningAmerican Political Science Review, 1974