STACKELBERG LEADERSHIP IN A MARKETING CHANNEL
- 1 March 2001
- journal article
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 3 (1), 13-26
- https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198901000282
Abstract
This paper provides an answer to the question who should, if any, lead a marketing channel? We consider a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer where each player controls his advertising rate and margin. Supposing that advertising has a carry over effect on demand, we adopt a dynamic model. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are characterised and outcomes compared with an efficient coordinated solution. Our findings suggest that manufacturer's leadership reduces inefficiency in a channel and is more beneficial to the consumer.Keywords
This publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
- Equilibrium Pricing and Advertising Strategies in a Marketing ChannelJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1999
- Managing a Distribution Channel Under Asymmetric Information with Performance RequirementsManagement Science, 1997
- Vertical Strategic Interaction: Implications for Channel Pricing StrategyMarketing Science, 1997
- Channel Coordination Mechanisms for Customer SatisfactionMarketing Science, 1995
- A Dynamic Model of Channel Member Strategies for Marketing ExpendituresMarketing Science, 1992
- Implicit Understandings in Channels of DistributionManagement Science, 1985
- Managing Channel ProfitsMarketing Science, 1983
- The Marketing Channel: Who Should Lead This Extra-Corporate Organization?Journal of Marketing, 1970
- Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic ConditionsEconomica, 1962