Believing, holding true, and accepting
- 1 May 1998
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Informa UK Limited in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 1 (2), 140-151
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10001998058538695
Abstract
Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief.Keywords
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