Trade Credit, Relationship-specific Investment, and Product Market Power*
- 13 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Finance Review
- Vol. 19 (5), 1867-1923
- https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu038
Abstract
We rely on a model with incomplete contracts and bargaining power to argue that trade credit (TC) can serve as a commitment device for making relationship-specific investments (RSIs). Unlike existing theories, we explain within a single theoretical framework why TC is affected by firms’ bargaining power and by the specialized nature of transacted goods. Using a large panel of publicly listed firms and innovation-based proxies for RSI, we find strong support for the model’s predictions: TC increases in upstream firm’s RSI and downstream firm’s market power. Endogeneity concerns are addressed by using the passage of innovation-increasing state laws to instrument for RSI and import penetration to instrument for bargaining power.This publication has 51 references indexed in Scilit:
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