During the 1950s and 1960s the United States absorbed many of the costs of an open trading regime for its trading partners in Europe and Japan. However, as U.S. power has declined its leaders have become more concerned with specific national economic interests, making their behavior more similar to the behavior of policy makers in other states. This has led to a differentiated trading regime with some sectors characterized by greater liberality and others by more closure. The outcome of the Tokyo Round reflects this differentiation. The tariff reductions and the codes on civil aircraft, customs valuation, import licensing, and standards all contribute to a more open, nondiscriminatory, market-dominated regime. On the other hand, the treatment of agriculture, less-developed countries, and safeguards reinforces a discriminatory, government-dominated pattern of behavior and does little to increase trade. The codes dealing with subsidies and government procurement will probably increase trade but only at the cost of violating unconditional most favored nation treatment. Such a regime, based solely upon particular economic interests, is not inherently unstable despite its inconsistent application of rules and norms. It could, however, be destroyed by an external shock because of the absence of a hegemonic leader prepared to defend the general stability of the regime.