Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies
- 1 June 2011
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 39 (2), 123-139
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
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