More than a century ago far-sighted railroad builders and steamship operators were seeking the shortest intermodal itineraries between the eastern United States and the Orient. A combination of locational fact and the factual outcomes of 19th century railroad building left Chicago roughly equidistant in railway mileage from what became the four great US West-Coast port complexes in the Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle regions. Their nearly equivalent rail access to Chicago and points east has renewed significance in the container era. This paper concerns the efforts of US Pacific seaboard ports to stay ‘on the beaten track’ with respect to container shipments between Asia and the eastern United States. The West-Coast ports are transit points dividing the transcontinental and transoceanic segments of long intercontinental journeys. From origins to destinations there are, in fact, many possibly feasible itineraries, including all-water routes. The West-Coast ports have considerable control over their own site improvements. On the other hand, with respect to transiting container traffic, the ports may influence, but are unlikely to control, their own situations. Since the major container port facilities are very often on long-term lease to large intermodal carriers, the latter are making the important shipping and routeing decisions. The carriers tend in fact to set the tone and level of port competition. What is the nature of the competition between container ports? Is it a figment of the publicist's imagination and perpetuated by irrelevant statistical boasting? Is it perhaps something forced on the ports by carriers eager to play one port off against another in a ‘lowest bid’ game? At what geographical scale might port competition be most useful or, maybe, least wasteful?