Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal—subpersonal distinction
- 29 January 2009
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
This chapter argues that the distinction between System 1 and System 2 corresponds to that between subpersonal and personal reasoning. But even if the distinctions do not align in this way, a weaker claim still stands. The distinction between personal and subpersonal reasoning marks one broad binary division in human reasoning, and one that needs to be acknowledged in psychological theory. Indeed, it may be the only such division. Most dual-systems theorists accept that System 1 is actually a suite of systems, and several contributors suggest that System 2 may also fragment in various ways. Indeed, there could be hybrid systems at a subpersonal level, with some System 1 properties and some System 2 properties. Personal reasoning, on the other hand, constitutes a distinct level of mental activity, which can be clearly distinguished from the lower, subpersonal one.Keywords
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social CognitionAnnual Review of Psychology, 2008
- Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive JudgmentPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,2002
- Dual-Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory SystemsPersonality and Social Psychology Review, 2000
- Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinctionPhilosophical Explorations, 2000
- A model of dual attitudes.Psychological Review, 2000
- Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought ExperimentThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1998
- The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Psychological Bulletin, 1996
- Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a ContextMind, 1992
- Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1989
- Psychophysical and theoretical identificationsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 1972