Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- 1 June 1985
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 36 (1), 55-85
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric InformationThe Review of Economic Studies, 1981
- Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock marketsJournal of Economic Theory, 1978
- The Competitive Solution for N-Person Games Without Transferable Utility, With an Application to Committee GamesAmerican Political Science Review, 1978
- A dynamical model of political equilibriumJournal of Economic Theory, 1977
- A note on “fulfilled expectations” equilibriaJournal of Economic Theory, 1977
- Expectations and the neutrality of moneyJournal of Economic Theory, 1972
- On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choicePublic Choice, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the GameManagement Science, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium PointsManagement Science, 1968
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic ModelManagement Science, 1967