Courts
Top Cited Papers
- 1 May 2003
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 118 (2), 453-517
- https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303321675437
Abstract
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.Keywords
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