A Theory of Partisan Support and Entry Deterrence in Electoral Competition

Abstract

I develop a model of electoral competition with partisan campaign support. Voters’ utilities are defined over candidate locations and the amounts of party campaign support that they receive. Parties’ utilities are defined over the location of the winning candidate and how much support they dole out for their candidates. Analytical results identify cases in which parties will successfully pull the electorally induced preferences of their members away from their median voters’ ideal points and towards the party’s most favored policies. Equilibrium results yield several testable hypotheses. First, candidate policy positions and parties’ campaign contributions should be responsive to district partisan predisposition, independent of the policy preferences of a district’s median voter. Second, uncontested elections should occur more often in politically-lopsided districts than in districts where there are more even levels of political competition. Finally, there should be an inverse relationship between candidate policy extremity and partisan campaign support.