Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?”
- 5 February 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 9 (1), 69-87
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00298.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 51 references indexed in Scilit:
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