Conservation and Aid: Designing More Effective Investments in Natural Resource Governance Reform

Abstract

Biodiversity conservation outcomes are closely related to the rules and institutions governing resource use. Creating local incentives for conservation through more secure resource tenure is central to conservation outcomes on private and communal lands, where the preponderance of biodiversity occurs. Conservation efforts in sub-Saharan Africa are therefore centrally concerned with governance dynamics and institutional reform processes, such as the decentralization of property rights, and how best to achieve such reforms. Traditional mechanisms for financing conservation efforts in Africa rely heavily on funds channeled through multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. The history of development aid highlights a range of constraints these aid agencies face in terms of working toward more effective resource governance arrangements and promoting reforms. Government aid agencies possess incentives for promoting large-scale and short-term projects that maximize expenditure volumes and tend to define issues in technical rather than political terms. The history of development aid suggests that these and other characteristics of aid agencies impedes their ability to influence governance reform processes and that aid funding may discourage the adoption of reforms. Greater emphasis in African conservation financing needs to be placed on flexible, small-scale investments aligned to local interests and constituencies that prioritize innovation, learning, and experimentation. Additionally, more research is required that explores the linkages between conservation funding, donor decision-making processes, and governance reforms.