Abstract
This contribution argues that analysis of the overthrow of President Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 has tended to overemphasize external factors in the revolution, while underplaying local dynamics, which were complex, difficult to understand, and did not fit with a much simpler narrative of democratic change, inspired by external encouragement. In reality, popular discontent, mobilized by local elites in their support during a highly competitive electoral process, led to elite defection and cross-regional political alliances that severely undermined the Akaev regime. International engagement, and Western-funded NGOs and civil society groups played a much more marginal role than is normally portrayed. For the most part, Western groups engaged with an almost ‘virtual’ sphere of politics, in which NGOs and democracy groups predominated, but where there was little ability to influence the real world of the Kyrgyz polity. The narrative that exaggerated external factors and the role of civil society has been used by neighbouring authoritarian leaders, in their own interests. It also raised expectations of political change in Kyrgyzstan that were unlikely to be fulfilled.