We experimentally examine how employees' employment horizons and the performance measures in their incentive contracts affect employee effort and performance. Economic models suggest that contracts that incorporate leading measures of firm performance mitigate the shortsighted efforts of employees whose employment horizons are not aligned with the firm's profitability horizon, but have less influence on effort choices as employment horizons approach the firm's profitability horizon. We argue that incorporating forward-looking measures in incentive contracts influences employee effort allocation regardless of employment horizon because these measures have both decision-influencing and decision-facilitating benefits. Results show that employees with short employment horizons exert more farsighted effort when their incentive contracts incorporate forward-looking measures than when they incorporate only contemporaneous measures, consistent with decision-influencing benefits. However, employees with long employment horizons not only exert more farsighted effort but are also more efficient in task execution with contracts that incorporate forward-looking measures because of decision-influencing benefits.