Ownership, control, valuation and performance of Brazilian corporations
Open Access
- 1 January 2006
- journal article
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Ownership and Control
- Vol. 4 (1), 300-308
- https://doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i1c2p6
Abstract
This paper analyzes the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies and the effect of cash flow and voting rights on firm valuation and performance. Ownership is quite concentrated in Brazil with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that non-voting shares and indirect control structures are largely used to concentrate control with reduced overall investment in the company. Our results support the hypothesis that firm valuation and performance are positively related to cash flow concentration, and negatively related to voting concentration and to the separation of voting from cash flow rights. Moreover, firm valuation and performance are relatively higher for firms with controlling shareholders when compared to firms without controlling shareholders.Keywords
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