ISSN / EISSN : 1392-1126 / 1392-1126
Current Publisher: Vilnius University Press (10.15388)
Total articles ≅ 1,797
Latest articles in this journal
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 170-182; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.15
Translation and Preface – Kristina Baranovaitė
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 71-82; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.6
The aim of this paper is to discuss the later development of Nietzsche’s notion of ressentiment in the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Vladimir Jankelevitch. In the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the concept of ressentiment is used to explain a revolution in morality. It is argued that ressentiment should not be understood with appeal to the motivation of a subject, whose notion Nietzsche refuses, or to the intensity of exterior excitation, but rather to the function of memory. In Deleuze’s theory, ressentiment is understood as the product of reactive forces that triumph over the active by eliminating the faculty of forgetting. The man of ressentiment is said to be unable to get rid of external excitations and, in turn, he projects his frustration on other people. Because of this, the figure of a “faulty other” functions as a priori of the man of ressentiment. In the philosophy of Jankelevitch, ressentiment is also understood as a negative, anti-vital phenomenon. However, Jankelevitch also introduces the positive notion of ressentiment, which functions as a precondition of authentic forgiveness.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 21-32; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.2
Nicolai Hartmann interprets the logic of knowledge as a dialectical process that must reveal the processionality of being itself. Sesemann not only extends Hartmann‘s philosophical insights, but also supplements them significantly. He also understands the knowledge of reality not as an analysis of static objects, but as a dynamic and temporal reconstruction of becoming reality. Acknowledging the limitations of intuition, he returns to the possibilities of logically formed knowledge. Sesemann argues that the logical constructions of knowledge must maintain a connection with primal intuition. However, logically formed knowledge is limited by its static nature. A dialectic is needed to reveal a dynamically changing being. I will begin the article by discussing the relationship between intuition and logical knowledge, then examine the problem of the ideal being and conclude by evaluating the significance of dialectics in Sesemann’s theory of knowledge. According to Sesemann, the dialectic, unlike formal logic, must reveal not the ideal laws of thought, but how live knowledge takes place. Dialectics allows one to analyze being as incomplete and indefinite, as becoming and open to infinite change, it allows one to relate a separate aspect of knowledge to the whole.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 45-57; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.4
This article analyses the Plotinian reconsideration of the link between the definition of happiness and the homonymy of life. To safeguard Platonism, Plotinus inverts the Aristotelian discussions of homonymy and its metaphysical implications, and presents the prior-posterior relationship in terms of progressive degradation. Happiness does not consist of “life” in general (understood in a univocal sense) nor of the “rational life” (understood as the sum of genus and specific difference); rather, it consists of the life that is situated in the ontologically first and most perfect degree, which is the life that pertains to intelligence and is consubstantial with it, and of which the other lives are progressively degraded derivations. The man who possesses the first and perfect life of the intelligible in actuality, like the gods, can be considered happy.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 83-93; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.7
This article is a Heideggerian inquiry into the possibility of ontological experience, that is, the possibility of experiencing the ontological difference, something wholly distinct from beings. Heidegger, as we know, articulated this as the question of Being. It is a paradoxical question that cannot, at first sight, be answered phenomenologically (in the Husserlian style): if any conscious experience presupposes the constitution of an intentional object in the act of experience, there must be something in any experience.In this article, I set out to defend the position that ontological experience is possible and central to the human existence. This view rests on the Heideggerian notion of the affective grounds of all thinking, the attunement of any experience by moods. I will argue that: 1) any thinking is attuned by moods; 2) ontological experience (i.e. experiencing something wholly distinct from beings) occurs in certain negative moods. 3) ontological experience is possible only through failure, a malfunction in the fulfilment of meaning; 4) ontological experience is possible in art rather than in science (or in some rigorous philosophy).
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 8-20; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.1
This article will show how Natorp’s criticism of Husserlian phenomenology was one of the most important triggers of the hermeneutical transformation of Heideggerian phenomenology. Concepts like hermeneutical intuition, or tools like formal indication, are the means that Heidegger worked out in order to preserve the phenomenological access to pre-theoretical life as it gives itself. The first part of this article is devoted to presenting Natorp’s criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology and Husserl’s attempts to answer them. The second part will illustrate how Heidegger, criticizing Natorp, retrieves the validity of the phenomenological intuition and expression by opening up their original, pre-theoretical meanings. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger’s attempt to describe the motivation of philosophical activity in transcendental terms.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 107-112; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.9
The most urgent challenge of this year – the COVID-19 pandemic and measures of response to it – has sharpened and accelerated the process which was initially driven by bureaucratization and formalization: increasing depersonalization of academic life and the erosion of the university as a unique form of coexistence. The Assuming the concept of the university as a value category, this article aims to review and assess the changes in the self-perception of the academic community that have matured and acquired institutional forms in an attempt to adapt to rapidly shifting societal expectations and needs. Modern trends in university development are best expressed in terms such as “bureaucratization”, “formalization”, “depersonalization”, “instrumentalization of knowledge”, and “community fragmentation”. The pandemic of effective management that has affected Western universities and has gradually reached Vilnius University, no less than the pandemic of COVID-19 and administrative response to it, weakens the academic community based on autonomous and collegial decisions, which should be considered among the most important grounds of uniqueness of university as an institution.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 154-169; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.14
The article dwells upon the issue of a subject intrinsic to the art of the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, it elicits the reasons determining the problematization of “the Self” category inherent in the aesthetic program of the Moscow Conceptualism, preeminently with regards to the works of Dmitry Prigov. “The crisis of the language describing ‘the Self’” has been considered as discrediting the dominant discursive models, disabling the possibility of individual expressing. Within the first part of the article we problematize “the Self” category inherent in the aesthetic program of the Moscow Conceptualism, examine the dominant discursive models and denote the crisis of the language describing “the Self.” The second part is devoted to the issue of “the personal consciousness” coming into being within the aesthetic program of Moscow Conceptualism. The Self is considered as a “category of categories” in dichotomy between “the collective” and “individual” ones. Finally, the third part represents the analysis of a subject of the aesthetic activity. “An imaginary personality” intrinsic to the works of Dmitry Prigov is considered as a subject of “a gnoseological game.”
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 125-136; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.10
Schmitt makes a distinction between politics and the political; however, he does not speak about the distinction between morality and the moral. By introducing the concept of the moral, we aim to show the weak points of his critique of liberalism. The aim of the article is to look at Schmitt’s concept of the political from the perspective of the moral. This helps to reveal previously unseen aspects of his theory. First, the ontology of the moral stands in direct competition with the ontology of the political. Secondly, the political is not a separate ontology because it depends on the primacy of anthropological presuppositions. Thirdly, Schmitt’s concept of the political is paradoxically like the liberal stance of morality, which is the object of his critique.
Problemos, Volume 98, pp 125-135; doi:10.15388/problemos.98.11
It is argued that scientific progress occurs not with the cumulative growth of knowledge or when theories get closer to the truth but with discovering new domains and new theories that fit these domains. This horizontal view on the direction of scientific progress (in contrast to vertical, when we aim to get from here to the abstract and ephemeral truth) allows avoiding traditional objections posed by the incommensurability thesis and pessimistic induction, namely, that radical theory changes leave no room for progress. According to this perspective, the discovery of quantum mechanics as a new field of inquiry is a progress in itself, since this discovery had opened up a new distinctive domain of physics and a new theory that fits this domain. While some perspectives on scientific progress maintain that there is a need for correspondence between competing theories, we shift the emphasis from correspondence towards the discovery of new domains and new theories that apply to those domains. This approach allows overcoming the problem of theoretical discontinuity after scientific revolutions. Correspondence between theories is an important but not necessary condition for progress, while the falsifiability of theories as a means of demonstrating the boundaries of old theories and domains and beginnings of the new domains and theories (instead of being merely a means of refutation) is a necessary condition.