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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-17; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09798-8

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 105-106; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09797-9

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 189-198; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09796-w

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-33; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09795-x

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-11; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09792-0

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-16; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09794-y

Abstract:
Unamuno believes that longing for immortality is what motivates nearly all of human behavior. Unfortunately, in a world in which many people despair of ever achieving true personal immortality, we increasingly turn to what he calls mere “shadows of immortality” for comforting ideas about how our names, energy, or basic material substance will carry on in our absence. Unamuno advocates fighting against such despair, staying out of the shadows, and longing for personal immortality even when it seems impossible. Unamuno’s approach to this issue resembles, in a few significant ways, Kierkegaard’s struggle for the cultivation of subjective selfhood. At the same time, it also runs afoul of Nietzsche’s derisive claims about immortality-seekers. Whereas Nietzsche sees longing for immortality as a sign of being too weak to make the most of mortal life, the more Kierkegaardian Unamuno counters that it is a sign of strong appreciation for life to demand, without surrender, that there be more of it. Given the proper understanding of Nietzsche’s claims about the eternal recurrence, I think he and Unamuno might not be quite as far apart as it initially seems. However, exploring the latter’s critique of the former suggests an intriguing way of seeing the contemporary analytic debate about the desirability of immortality. Building on Unamuno’s position, one could argue that pessimism about the value of immortality is actually indicative of a flawed character and an impoverished relationship with life.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-11; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09793-z

Abstract:
As a matter of fact, few, if any, theists have been expressivists about morality. This is probably because expressivism is thought to have unacceptable theological implications. That is, it is thought to imply (1) that God’s goodness depends on our desire-like states, (2) that God’s goodness is not a real property, (3) that it is not true that God is good, and (4) that God’s moral thoughts have no explanation. I argue that expressivism has no such implications and conclude that expressivism is theologically acceptable.
, David Efird
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-18; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09790-2

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, Tyler Dalton McNabb
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-15; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-18; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09789-9

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-15; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09784-6

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 91-97; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09788-w

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 1-2; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09787-x

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 99-103; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09786-y

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-23; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09785-5

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-8; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09783-7

Abstract:
Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98, 2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable to morally valuable minds?’ and that, moreover, the universe isn’t so hospitable. For it is metaphysically possible that psychophysical laws be substantially more permissive than they in fact are, allowing for the realisation of morally valuable consciousness by exceptionally simple physical states and systems, rather than the complex states of brains. I reply that Sinhababu’s argument rests upon unsupported claims and that we have reason to doubt that an omnibenevolent God would make the psychophysical laws more permissive than they in fact are.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-21; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09782-8

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 229-230; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09781-9

Abstract:
Department of Philosophy, Stetson University, Deland, FL, 32723, USA R. L. Hall You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar Correspondence to R. L. Hall. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and Permissions Hall, R.L. Preface. Int J Philos Relig 88, 229–230 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09781-9 Download citation Published: 30 October 2020 Issue Date: December 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09781-9
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 307-312; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09780-w

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-19; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 137-138; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09778-4

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 223-227; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09776-6

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Sara Aronowitz, Marilie Coetsee,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-22; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09775-7

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 1-4; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09777-5

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-20; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09773-9

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 125-134; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09774-8

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 135-152; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09768-6

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 153-170; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09772-w

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 1-3; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09771-x

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Tyron Goldschmidt
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 133-136; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09770-y

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 171-187; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09769-5

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 107-123; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09767-7

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 67-89; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09766-8

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 3-24; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09765-9

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 25-41; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09762-y

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 43-65; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09764-w

Abstract:
Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis’s modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: (1) God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; (2) God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can be said to exist in worlds (if universals exist), i.e. through transworld identity; (3) God can be said to be a scattered individual, with a part of God existing in each world; and, (4) God can be said to exist in each world, through His existing from the standpoint of each world. In the literature, (1)–(4) have been rejected as viable options. I grant that (1) and (3) are not viable. However, I believe that (2) and (4) have been too hastily rejected. Herein, I develop ways to respond to objections to (2) and (4), and conclude that (4) is a viable option for Lewisian theists.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 287-305; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09763-x

Abstract:
The popularity of theodicy over the past several decades has given rise to a countermovement, “anti-theodicy”, which admonishes attempts at theodicy for various reasons. This paper examines one prominent anti-theodical objection: that it is hubristic, and attempts to form an approach to theodicy which evades this objection. To do so I draw from the work of Eleonore Stump, who provides a framework by which we can glean second-personal knowledge of God. From this knowledge, I argue that we can derive a theodicy which does not utilise the kind of analytic theorising anti-theodicists accuse of intellectual hubris.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 203-208; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09755-x

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 217-222; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09758-8

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William Hasker, , Michael Tooley, James P. Sterba
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 229-243; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09761-z

Abstract:
In my comment on Jim Sterba’s book, I claimed that traditional theists would find his moral requirement on God, MEPR1, deeply repugnant and unacceptable. He maintains, on the contrary, that religious people will accept this principle. If they accept it, then they should agree that the Israelites, in my Deuteronomic satire, have a valid logical and ethical case against the Lord—but they won’t agree to that. If they do in some way accept the principle, they will accept it as a prima facie obligation, a very different matter from accepting it as an exceptionless requirement, which is what Sterba needs them to do. In any case, if he is to show a logical incompatibility between God and evil, he needs to defeat the best theistic answer to his argument; it’s not enough to defeat a weaker answer built on a (possibly unwise) initial concession by his opponents. I suggested a couple of modifications for MEPR1, in the interest of making it a more plausible candidate for an exceptionless moral requirement. Sterba demurs. With regard to the exception for sufferers who were themselves the agents of the moral evil in question, consider this example: The dictator of a small nation starts a malicious war of aggression in order to extend his territory. The offensive fails, but results in huge amounts of suffering and death, and the dictator’s palace is surrounded by an angry mob. On Sterba’s unmodified principle, he has a right to be transported to a remote location where he can live out his life in luxury and safety; he has this right against anyone who is able easily to do this for him. As for future generations, I am far more confident that we have a responsibility to care for the earth than that future generations of people, who do not exist and may never exist, have rights over us here and now. And I think that in general it is implausible to suppose that all of our duties can be cashed out in terms of rights that individuals have over us. (Suppose there is something that is seriously needed by many of my neighbors—for instance, access to a secondary-level education. I can easily provide this for some few of them, but my resources are inadequate to provide it for all. It is plausible that I have an obligation to provide for as many as I reasonably can, but that no particular individual has a right over me to have me make such provision.) Throughout his book Sterba appeals to the idea of an “ideally just and powerful state” as an analogy to help us see what we should morally expect of a good God. In his RepliesFootnote 1 he infers that, since I did not refer to this idea in my comment, he has satisfied or neutralized my objections to the notion. This inference is badly mistaken. In fact, I view the notion as completely unusable; it plays no role at all in my thinking about these topics. It is obvious that no such state exists; nor, I should say, is there anything like an approximation to it.Footnote 2 Given what we know of human nature, I do not think anything of the sort is possible. And I should strongly oppose giving to any human government powers sufficient to make it a plausible analog for the divine governance of the world. (Readers of J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings will recall that both Gandalf and Galadriel (beings of exalted status, far superior to humans in wisdom and goodness) refused the Ring of Power. The Ring would have enabled either of them to overcome great evils and accomplish much that was good. But in the end, it would overpower them and the result would be even greater evil.) As has been noted, one objection against NEPR1 is that it would greatly impair the morally significant exercise of free will. To be sure, the principle does not require that the exercise of free will shall itself be controlled, only that the harmful consequences of such exercise will be prevented. But once it becomes generally known that such consequences will not be allowed to occur, it will become in effect impossible for anyone to act in the ways that would have such results. Furthermore, the motivation of humans to care for one another by preventing serious harms to others will be considerably lessened, once it is recognized that such harms will not be allowed to occur in any case.Footnote 3 Sterba mentions, in his Replies, an additional feature of his view that is designed to avoid these disadvantages. In cases where human beings have failed in their duty of preventing the harmful consequences of moral evil, God will prevent part of the evil consequences, but will leave another part to occur. Thus it will not be so clear to those who intend harm to others that their harm cannot succeed, nor will persons of goodwill be deprived of motivation to prevent evils. Sterba pictures a situation in which a child is abducted, where a bystander has the opportunity, and therefore the obligation, to prevent the abduction before it occurs. If the bystander fails in this responsibility, God arranges for police officers to arrest the abductors before they have killed or physically harmed the child. This prevents the worst consequences of the abduction, but may well leave the child traumatized from the experience. So people who have the opportunity to save others from harm will still realize that things will be worse if they fail in their responsibility to act. This strategy fails. The requirement is that an agent prevent “significant or horrendous” evils. This wording is vague, but in any particular case there will be a threshold, such that harm falling below that threshold is relatively unimportant and can be permitted, whereas harm above the threshold would violate the sufferer’s rights and must be prevented. Now, if a human intervenes in such a way as to keep the evil consequences below the threshold, well and good. If the human being fails in her responsibility to intervene, but God acts so as to prevent harm above the...
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 209-212; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09756-w

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Ronald L. Hall
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 213-216; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09757-9

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 223-228; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09759-7

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 249-258; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09752-0

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 201-202; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09754-y

Abstract:
McCloskey, H. J. (1968). On being an atheist. In H. Hawton (Ed.), Question 1 (pp. 62–69). London: Pemberton Publishing. Rowe, W. L. (1979). The Problem of Evil and some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly,16(4), 335–341. Sterba, J. (2019). Is a Good God Logically Possible?. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillon. Download references Correspondence to Michael S. Jones. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and Permissions Jones, M.S. Introduction to the symposium. Int J Philos Relig (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09754-y Download citation Published: 22 April 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09754-y
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 245-249; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09760-0

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R. L. Hall
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 199-200; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09753-z

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 273-286; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09751-1

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International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 87, pp 135-136; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09750-2

László Bernáth,
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 88, pp 259-272; doi:10.1007/s11153-020-09747-x

Abstract:
The evidential problem of evil involves a rarely discussed challenge, namely the challenge of defending theism against the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator. Our argument uses a Bayesian framework and it starts by showing that if the only alternative to classical theism is naturalistic atheism, then fine-tuning can render theism virtually certain, even in the face of evil. But if the alternatives include the hypothesis of a morally indifferent creator, theism is defeated even if the fine-tuning premise is accepted. The resulting version of the evidential problem is unsolvable using the tools that are currently deployed by theists against evil.
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