How a choice between emission trading and tax schemes affects an environment-biased Environmental Protection Bureau's discretion?
- 26 May 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Science of The Total Environment
- Vol. 736, 139141
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.139141
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71725007, 71673210, 91647119)
- National Social Science Foundation of China (19ZDA083)
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