Effects of CEO miscalibration on compensation and hedging
- 9 October 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 30, 216-220
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.10.007
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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