Closed Theories, Falsificationism and Non-Cumulative Progress
Open Access
- 23 October 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Vilnius University Press in Problemos
- Vol. 98, 125-135
- https://doi.org/10.15388/problemos.98.11
Abstract
A peer-reviewed journal of philosophy founded in 1968 that publishes research articles, book reviews and an academic chronicle. Indexed in the Scopus database from 2002 and in the Web of Science database from 2005.Keywords
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