R&D Investment Competition and Efficiency in a Mixed Duopoly Model, with Endogenous Spillover
Open Access
- 3 February 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by EDP Sciences in E3S Web of Conferences
- Vol. 235, 03075
- https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202123503075
Abstract
In this paper, a mixed duopoly model is used to explain how ownership structure influences the innovation performances of firms. A three stage-game is adopted in the study. In first stage, firms make R&D expenditure which leads to a profit increasing; in the second stage, firms choose the level of technological improvement they would like to share with the rival; and production quantity will be decided in the final stage. The theory explains that as long as public firms continue their dual roles as productive entities and social safety nets, they cannot be purely profit-oriented, and continue to have poor innovation performance.This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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