Organizational learning capability and battlefield performance

Abstract

While intended as a bridge between the concepts of learning organization and organizational learning, current conceptualizations of organizational learning capability still predominantly lean toward the learning organization side, specifically directed at profit firms. The purpose of this paper is to propose a four-dimensional model of organization learning capability that leans more toward the organizational learning side, specifically directed at nonprofit and government organizations in general, and army organizations in particular. This model is applied to the British Army in the Second World War. The paper entails a secondary analysis of historical and military sources and data. It is found that the British Army possessed only a moderate learning capability, which can be plausibly, but not exclusively, related to differences in battlefield performance between the British and the German Army in the Second World War. The research scope of the paper is limited to the analysis of one particular army in the Second World War. Implications for theory reside in the importance of organizational learning capability and its dimensions to the effectiveness of “lessons learned” processes inside organizations. The paper has clear practical implications for armies and organizations that resemble armies in one or more aspects, like prisons, correctional facilities, police forces, hospitals, mental institutions and fire departments. The paper ranks among the first organizational papers to analyze army operations and functioning from the perspective of organizational learning capability.