Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
Open Access
- 1 March 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier BV in EURO Journal on Computational Optimization
- Vol. 8 (1), 3-31
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s13675-019-00114-8
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- University of Southampton
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