Auctions for buying back groundwater for environmental purposes: Which design performs better?
- 4 August 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 72 (3), 931-948
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12442
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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