Price Discovery and Learning during the German 5G Auction
Open Access
- 18 June 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 14 (6), 274
- https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14060274
Abstract
The auctioning of frequency has to comply with a multitude of requirements in order to guarantee a transparent and efficient process. The German Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) has opted for a design that provides participants with information on the highest bid after each round for every band along with information on the bidder. We evaluate the price formation efficiency in this setup to see how fast prices become informative about the final auction value. We find that prices are partially informative right from the beginning which allows us to conclude that participants were able to learn fast from their competitors’ bidding behavior and validates the choice of the agency to implement the auction in the present format.This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and BehaviourThe Economic Journal, 2017
- The Law of One Price? Price Dispersion on the Auction Market for Fine WineJournal of Wine Economics, 2017
- SWITCHING TO A TEMPORARY CALL AUCTION IN TIMES OF HIGH UNCERTAINTYJournal of Financial Research, 2010
- The influence of call auction algorithm rules on market efficiencyJournal of Financial Markets, 2006
- User Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical ExplorationMIS Quarterly, 2004
- Auctions and the Price of ArtJournal of Economic Literature, 2003
- Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris BourseJournal of Political Economy, 1999
- Ascending auctionsEuropean Economic Review, 1998
- Price Trends at Livestock AuctionsAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1982
- The Federal Communications CommissionThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1959