American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

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ISSN : 1051-3558
Published by: Philosophy Documentation Center (10.5840)
Total articles ≅ 1,666
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Latest articles in this journal

Michael Bowler, Mirela Oliva, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 363-365; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2021953235

Joseph G. Trabbic, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 389-409; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2021610232

Abstract:
Jean-Luc Marion proposes what he calls the “phenomenology of givenness” (phénoménologie de la donation) as the true “first philosophy.” In this paper I consider his critique of previous first philosophies and his argument for the phenomenology of givenness as their replacement. I note several problems with the phenomenology of givenness and conclude that it does not seem ready yet to assume the title of “first philosophy.”
Michael Bowler, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 549-569; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq202161227

Abstract:
In his essay, I examine the nature of sacred time, focusing primarily though not exclusively on two aspects of sacred time: that it is “set aside” from use and that in this time human beings can be in union and communion with and in God. I argue that chronological, “clock” time and Heideggerian “datable” (in-order-to) time are incapable of being directly consecrated as sacred time. In order to understand sacred time, I investigate the Fall and how this results in an essentially instrumentalist understanding of the world and time, which has its ultimate motive in the drive for human self-sufficiency. Only against this backdrop can one properly understand the nature (physis) of human temporality and historicity with respect to sacred time as set apart from use and as that time we spend and thus share with Christ, thereby coming into union and communion with God.
George Heffernan, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 455-479; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq202161228

Abstract:
Stein claims that Husserl’s transcendental idealism makes it impossible to clarify the transcendence of the world because it posits that consciousness constitutes being. Inspired by Aquinas, Stein counters that making thinking the measure of being deprives what is of its epistemological and ontological independence from and primacy over what thinks. She contends that this approach inverts the natural relationship between the mind and the world. Given the complicated relationship between them, however, the question is whether Stein’s argument that Husserl lacked an adequate understanding of and appreciation for the phenomenon of transcendence is sound. In fact, Husserl’s treatments of “limit problems of phenomenology” in his manuscripts from 1908 to 1937, which were only recently published in Husserliana XLII (2014), show that he undertook extensive investigations of metaphysical, metaethical, and religious and theological questions. Tragically, Stein was prevented from gaining an even remotely complete picture of Husserl’s work. In this paper, therefore, I examine Stein’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in light of the fuller evidence.
Gregory R. P. Stacey, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 21-48; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020124213

Abstract:
Thomas Williams has argued that the doctrine of univocity (the thesis that God and creatures can be predicated of univocally) is true and salutary. Such a claim is frequently contested, particularly in regard to the property—if there be any such—of existence or being. Inspired by the thought of Francisco Suárez, I outline a way of understanding the thesis of the analogy of being that avoids the criticisms levelled by Williams and others against analogy. I further suggest that the metaphysically committed version of univocal predication favoured by many analytic philosophers of religion causes difficulties for the practice of perfect being theology, which is often taken to play an important role in the construction of kataphatic philosophical theologies. My exposition of the analogy of being is, I suggest, better fitted to the practice of perfect being theology and, thus, salutary for the practice of Christian natural theology.
Patrick H. Byrne, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 69-93; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020127215

Abstract:
Two recent studies by Joseph Torchia and Paul Griffiths show the importance of Augustine’s critique of the vice of curiositas to contemporary life and thought. Superficially, it might seem that Augustine condemned curiosity because it “seeks to find out whatever it wishes without restriction of any kind.” Though profoundly influenced by Augustine, Bernard Lonergan praised intellectual curiosity precisely insofar as it is motivated by an unrestricted desire to know, rather than by less noble motives. Drawing upon the researches of Torchia and Griffiths, this article endeavors to show that Augustine does not simply equate curiositas with an unrestricted desire to know, and that the virtue of intellectual curiosity as Lonergan understood it is in fact endorsed by Augustine by means of its relationship to the virtue of studiositas. This more nuanced view of the virtues and vices of intellect can provide guidance for contemporary intellectual pursuits, both how to pursue and not to pursue knowledge.
Yul Kim, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 49-68; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2020128216

Abstract:
The goal of this paper is to analyze the response of John Duns Scotus to Godfrey of Fontaines’s argument against Henry of Ghent’s theory of the will’s self-motion. Godfrey’s argument is that, if the object is assumed to be causa sine qua non and the efficient causality is totally attributed to the will in the act of volition, it would also follow that not only the will’s motion but every motion in nature, such as, for example, the igniting of wood, is a self-motion. In this paper, I will explain that Scotus’s refutation of this argument in Reportatio II, d. 25 is based on his reflection upon the general possibility of self-motion as well as upon the indeterminacy of the will’s act. In doing so, I will show that the development of Scotus’s theory of the will’s motion is closely related to his universalized theory of self-motion.
Gary M. Atkinson, Philosophy Documentation Center
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 95, pp 337-339; https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2021952223

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