International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Journal Information
ISSN / EISSN : 0020-7047 / 1572-8684
Current Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC (10.1007)
Former Publisher:
Total articles ≅ 1,739
Current Coverage
SCOPUS
AHCI
LOCKSS
Archived in
SHERPA/ROMEO
EBSCO
Filter:

Latest articles in this journal

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09799-7

Abstract:
It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics’ pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by arguing that even if all experience is interpreted through concepts, there could still be a common core. Those who reject the common core thesis usually argue that no distinction between experience and interpretation can be made since all experience is per se already interpreted. The notion of an uninterpreted experience is self-defeating. Drawing on current research on nonconceptual mental content, I argue (a) that experiences can have nonconceptual content; (b) that interpretation must be understood as conceptualization and (c) that conceptualization presupposes a raw mental content that is not conceptualized. This raw content is not experienced as nonconceptual. Rather, the nonconceptual, uninterpreted common core is an abstraction which shows itself only through reflection. Thus, the existence of a common core is compatible with the fact that all experiences are interpreted.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-17; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09798-8

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 105-106; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09797-9

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 89, pp 189-198; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09796-w

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-33; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09795-x

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-11; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09792-0

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-16; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09794-y

Abstract:
Unamuno believes that longing for immortality is what motivates nearly all of human behavior. Unfortunately, in a world in which many people despair of ever achieving true personal immortality, we increasingly turn to what he calls mere “shadows of immortality” for comforting ideas about how our names, energy, or basic material substance will carry on in our absence. Unamuno advocates fighting against such despair, staying out of the shadows, and longing for personal immortality even when it seems impossible. Unamuno’s approach to this issue resembles, in a few significant ways, Kierkegaard’s struggle for the cultivation of subjective selfhood. At the same time, it also runs afoul of Nietzsche’s derisive claims about immortality-seekers. Whereas Nietzsche sees longing for immortality as a sign of being too weak to make the most of mortal life, the more Kierkegaardian Unamuno counters that it is a sign of strong appreciation for life to demand, without surrender, that there be more of it. Given the proper understanding of Nietzsche’s claims about the eternal recurrence, I think he and Unamuno might not be quite as far apart as it initially seems. However, exploring the latter’s critique of the former suggests an intriguing way of seeing the contemporary analytic debate about the desirability of immortality. Building on Unamuno’s position, one could argue that pessimism about the value of immortality is actually indicative of a flawed character and an impoverished relationship with life.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-11; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09793-z

Abstract:
As a matter of fact, few, if any, theists have been expressivists about morality. This is probably because expressivism is thought to have unacceptable theological implications. That is, it is thought to imply (1) that God’s goodness depends on our desire-like states, (2) that God’s goodness is not a real property, (3) that it is not true that God is good, and (4) that God’s moral thoughts have no explanation. I argue that expressivism has no such implications and conclude that expressivism is theologically acceptable.
, David Efird
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-18; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09790-2

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
, Tyler Dalton McNabb
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion pp 1-15; doi:10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
Back to Top Top