Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98, 2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable to morally valuable minds?’ and that, moreover, the universe isn’t so hospitable. For it is metaphysically possible that psychophysical laws be substantially more permissive than they in fact are, allowing for the realisation of morally valuable consciousness by exceptionally simple physical states and systems, rather than the complex states of brains. I reply that Sinhababu’s argument rests upon unsupported claims and that we have reason to doubt that an omnibenevolent God would make the psychophysical laws more permissive than they in fact are.

Department of Philosophy, Stetson University, Deland, FL, 32723, USA R. L. Hall You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar Correspondence to R. L. Hall. Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Reprints and Permissions Hall, R.L. Preface. Int J Philos Relig 88, 229–230 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09781-9 Download citation Published: 30 October 2020 Issue Date: December 2020 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09781-9