Não se pode estabelecer uma ligação efetiva entre os escritos de Thomas Paine e de Kant: a profundidade de tratamento dos temas e o ponto de partida para a sua discussão são distintos nestes dois autores, e Thomas Paine está longe de ser uma referência nos escritos políticos de Immanuel Kant. É inquestionável, no entanto, que existem pontos de contacto entre estes pensadores que, apesar de provirem de ambientes intelectuais tão diferentes, a história uniu num mesmo século, e a quem deu palcos tão distintos, ambos de grande relevância na sua época.As discussões teóricas acerca das transformações políticas e sociais da Europa do Século XVIII revelam inquietações filosóficas semelhantes, provenientes dos mais variados quadrantes. Umas, estão teoricamente bem estruturadas, como aquelas que aparecem em textos de Jean Jacques Rousseau e de Immanuel Kant. Outras, parecem não ser mais do que intuições de autodidatas e polemistas; estão neste caso os escritos de Thomas Paine.A escrita de Paine deu voz a muitas ideias que circulavam nas discussões intelectuais do seu tempo, mas antecipou também outras que viriam mais tarde a ser plenamente desenvolvidas, por vezes num sentido completamente diferente, por autores tão proeminentes como Kant. Neste sentido, a leitura simultânea de textos de Paine, como Rights of Man ou Dissertations on Government, The Affairs of the Bank and Paper Money, e do texto de Kant Zum ewigen Frieden permite identificar um conjunto de temas e de inquietações que atravessam os vários textos. O pensamento criativo, se bem que teoricamente pouco estruturado, de Paine parece ter antecipado noções que virão a ser exploradas por Kant, certamente com um alcance e sentido diferentes, no seu opúsculo acerca da paz, Zum ewigen Frieden.O presente artigo ilustrará como a “razão na história” antecipou nos textos de Thomas Paine alguns dos temas tratados porImmanuel Kant naquele opúsculo.

Me propongo reflexionar acerca de cómo leer las críticas de Mbembe a Kant como estandarte de la modernidad y reflexionar en torno al título, Crítica de la razón negra, de nuestro contemporáneo camerunés para comprender la crítica a la propuesta de diferenciación racial y racista de los pensadores de la modernidad europea. Me detengo en concreto en la conformación del concepto de raza y raza negra a partir de los textos de Kant y reflexiono acerca de algunas de las críticas que Mbembe expone. El objetivo es plantear el problema de cómo seguir leyendo a Kant conociendo su aportación a la cultura de las razas que se instaura en la modernidad y a pesar de las críticas al colonialismo que aparecen en sus últimas obras.

In Kants Gesamtwerk stehen Vernunftkritik, objektives Erkenntnisvermögen, subjektive Erkenntnis, Ethik, Aufklärung Öffentlichkeit und politische Teleologie in einem konsistenten Zusammenhang. Dieser wird in diesem Beitrag aufgezeigt. Anschließend wird die besondere Bedeutung des Kosmopoliten in allen Bereichen dieses Zusammenhangs herausgestellt.

No seu livro A cosmopolitan legal order. Kant, constitutional justice, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2018), Alex Stone Sweet e Clare Ryan partem da conceção kantiana e seus reflexos na teoria constitucional para explicar a emergência do que designam por ordem jurídica cosmopolita (cosmopolitan legal order) que, na Europa, se desenvolveu sob a égide da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos Humanos (1950) e da jurisprudência do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos Humanos. Esta ordem jurídica cosmopolita, para os autores, é um sistema jurídico multinível transnacional no qual os indivíduos são titulares de direitos justiciáveis, cabendo a todas as entidades públicas o dever de efetivar os direitos fundamentais daqueles que se encontram sob a sua jurisdição, sob supervisão de juízes nacionais e transnacionais.Neste trabalho, parte-se da análise desta proposta para, de seguida, refletir sobre alguns modelos de constitucionalismo global assentes em direitos como o modelo proposto por Kai Möller em The global model of constitutional rights (Oxford University Press, 2012). Termina-se com uma análise crítica das condições de possibilidade de um modelo cosmopolita de direitos humanos e fundamentais capaz de articular unidade e diversidade e assente em dimensões substanciais, institucionais e procedimentais.

This article presents a rework of three strata of a concept of the social which can be found in Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy without turning to his anthropological and historical works. To do this, the notions of human coexistence (natural right) and universal reciprocal coercion (civil right) that Kant describes in The Metaphysics of Morals are specified to point out that, with them, it is not possible to refer to a society, but to a form of it. Subsequently, some of the coordinates of the “ethical community” addressed in Religion… have been reworked to argue, on the one hand, that here we can speak of a society as such, and on the other hand, that it can build a bridge between the juridical society and the ethical education of people, i.e., between the external use of freedom and its internal use, because (a) it allows to socialize moral maxims and (b) these can harbor a peculiar intrinsic normativity.

This article is intended to explain the notion of “mathematical axioms” presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.This notion is developed mainly within the framework of a justification of the thesis of the methodological dualism of the rational sciences (mathematics and metaphysics). We argue that there are significant differences between the critical notion of mathematical axioms, the pre-critical developments and the Wolffian definitions. The notion of “axiom” that Kant intends to take from mathematical procedures is inscribed in his peculiar way of thinking this science. This paper studies the considerations of (i) Wolff’s mathematical texts, (ii) the pre-critical texts and (iii) the Critique of Pure Reason, and mentions the differences between them in the conclusion.

In the Transcendental Aesthetics, Kant introduces the distinction between intuitions and concepts. Intuitions are immediate and singular representations. Concepts are mediate and universal representations. In the Transcendental Logic, Kant defines the concept as a function or rule. The concept is a rule of unity of the multiplicity of intuition. This investigation aims to show that there is a tension between the definition of concept in the Aesthetics and the Dialectic with the notion of concept as function, according to its presentation in the Transcendental Logic. Our hypothesis is that the definition of concept as a function that is introduced in the Transcendental Logic is grounded on a sui generis notion of concept that comes into tension with the definition of concept as a representation by common marks.

Taking the Kantian interest in mental illnesses in Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view as a starting point, the following will focus on some aspects concerning cognitive disorders from a gnoseological perspective and some observations of practical and moral philosophy. After a terminological examination of the concept of pathology [Pathologie] and disease [Krankheit], I will analyze the relationship between 1. mental illness and cognitive faculty and the impact that cognitive disorders have on the formation of representations which can motivate practical action; 2. public sphere and private sphere as regards illness and normality. Secondly, I will investigate if and how it is possible to speak about “autonomy” in the case of mental disorder or if, for Kant, the mentally ill patient is only defined by the necessity of natural laws. In addition to this theoretical question, the third part of the paper will focus on the problem of the judgment of imputation in fragile subjects and psychopaths, explaining the Kantian position of legal protection. In the last paragraph, however, I will provide a positive interpretation of the illnesses of the faculty of desire, i.e. the Kantian conception of passions in politics.

This paper aims at presenting the Kantian consideration of the subject regarding the possibility of his theoretical-scientific determination and his practical-moral self-determination as well as the problematization of the relationship of these determinations. Initially, in view of the argumentation that characterizes the subject in the 1st Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, it is argued that such determination culminates in a subjectivist stance. Then, bearing in mind the characterization of the subject in the 2nd Edition of the Critique, it is argued that Kant structures a logical approach to the subject that enables the justification of his (self) determination. It is taken into consideration, afterwards, Kant's attempts to prove the relationship of these determinations and the result, attested in the Critique of Practical Reason, of his self-sufficiency. Finally, regarding the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the systematic outcome of the approach to the relationship of these determinations in the context of reflection is considered. The conclusion reached is that, aiming at the possibility of justifying scientific knowledge and ethical acting, the Kantian theory limits the characterization of the subject to a logical approach and, therefore, that this limitation does not allow - whether in the domains of knowledge and moral acting, or in the sphere of reflection – an objectively valid philosophical proof of its necessary relationship to be established.