Filozofia Nauki

Journal Information
ISSN / EISSN : 1230-6894 / 2657-5868
Published by: University of Warsaw (10.14394)
Total articles ≅ 90
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Maciej Głowacki
Published: 25 October 2021
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 29, pp 43-61; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0005

Abstract:
In this paper, I critically examine Kurt Gödel’s argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. While the main aim is to analyze the argument, I also wish to underscore the relevance of the original elements of Gödel’s philosophical thought. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, I introduce the reader to Gödel’s philosophy. In the second part, I reconstruct the formalist stance in the philosophy of mathematics, which is the object of Gödel’s criticism. In the third part, I sketch his argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. Finally, I discuss some controversies regarding the argument.
Krzysztof Krzysztof
Published: 25 October 2021
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 29, pp 63-79; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0006

Abstract:
The article presents a formal scheme of the analogy of proportionality formulated by Józef Maria Bocheński. Bocheński applies his theory to religious discourse in order to claim that the meaning of this discourse does not have to be established exclusively in a negative way, in opposition to the claims made by negative theology. The aim of this article is to show that the application of analogy to religious discourse does not work. Bocheński’s theory is criticized in three aspects. Firstly, by adopting the assumptions of the theory of analogy, one can easily prove that some relations considered within religious discourse are indistinguishable, thus leading to confusion. Secondly, analogy as utilized by Bocheński takes only the formal properties of relations into account, making religious discourse almost materially empty. Thirdly, any attempt to treat analogy as an isomorphism of relations results in difficulties with defining the domains of these relations. The conclusion emphasizes one more fact: the analogy of proportionality offered by Bocheński and applied to religious discourse is simply impractical and useless since nobody uses it.
Published: 25 October 2021
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 29, pp 109-138; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0002

Abstract:
In my recent book "Tropy i uniwersalia" (Tropes and Universals), I argued that Roman Ingarden’s theory of universals is in fact a kind of hidden nominalism. This claim has been subjected to serious criticism by Marek Piwowarczyk, who has defended Ingarden’s position and attempted to flesh out the Platonic theory of universals. In my reply, I argue that his interpretation of Platonism, though it fits Plato’s doctrine, does not correspond to Ingarden’s ontology. Ingarden, contrary to Piwowarczyk, did not regard participation between individual properties and pure ideal qualities as a kind of ontological dependence. Moreover, robust Platonism, proposed by Piwowarczyk, though solves some problems indicated in my book, has serious ontological consequences. Individuals have their character and existence in virtue of their relations to forms. Therefore, individuals are no longer independent substances, but rather relational beings. Perhaps it was Plato’s actual teaching, but it certainly contradicts Ingarden’s crucial insight that the world is ontologically autonomous. In this way, robust Platonism turns out to be surprisingly close to Idealism.
Published: 25 October 2021
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 29, pp 5-41; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0001

Abstract:
This paper discusses various aspects of thought (der Gedanke) according to Frege. I analyze Frege’s arguments that support key differences between thought and presentation (Vorstellung). On the other hand, I contrast Frege’s standpoint with Russell’s position. Frege’s thought is the equivalent of Russell’s proposition. However, there are vast differences between the elements that constitute thought and proposition. Consequently, there is a difference in the ontological status between the thoughtF (der Gedanke) and the propositionR. The relation between fact — that is, the true thought — and the True (das Wahre) is the crucial point here. Although there are numerous interpretations of Frege’s view on this matter, it seems that all of them lead to serious difficulties. The considerations revolve around the following question: is Frege a consistent Platonist or a follower of the Kantian tradition?
Katarzyna Barska
Published: 25 October 2021
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 29, pp 81-107; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0004

Abstract:
This article is an attempt to defend two unfashionable positions in contemporary philosophy: Platonic realism and Ingarden’s rich ontology. This defense is in part prompted by the publication of Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i Uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne (Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations), in which the author maintains that both Platonic realism and Ingarden’s transcendental realism can be considered as a hidden nominalism. However, this statement: a) is based on a specific interpretation of Platonism, b) narrows down the understanding of universals to only one sense of the term, c) involves misconceptions which are the result of the misinterpretation of Ingarden’s ontology — for instance, it is hypothesized that Ingarden’s main problem with the concept of universals is extreme separateness of properties from qualities (Ingarden’s ideal qualities may be interpreted as universals), d) takes a narrow view of the concept of participation, where the part—whole relationship is almost physical in character. This paper attempts to show: a) that Plato’s and Ingarden’s theory of ideas (Forms) may also be open to other interpretations, b) that the assumption that universals are “one in many,” would make it difficult for anyone to be called a realist, or become a realist (there have been concerns as to whether all kinds of immanent realism correspond to the proposed definition), c) what is the source of various interpretations of participation, d) that arguments for the transcendence of universals are well-founded.
Jacek Paśniczek
Published: 31 December 2020
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 28, pp 25-38; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0020

Abstract:
Nothingness is a perennial subject of philosophical inquiry. From the logical point of view, the problem is that “nothing” is an ambiguous word: it can be used either as a negated existential quantifier or as a singular term. If it is used as a singular term, then it refers to nothing at all. In this paper, a number of recent formal treatments of nothingness are critically discussed. The author proposes some new logical approaches to nothingness, involving notions of generalized quantifiers, Meinongian objects, and aspectual objects.
Maciej Tarnowski
Published: 31 December 2020
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 28, pp 83-102; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0024

Abstract:
This is a review of Michał Barcz’s book Mechanika działań. Filozoficzny spór wokół przyczynowej teorii działania (Mechanics of Actions: Philosophical Dispute over the Causal Theory of Action). The book discusses various causal accounts of intentional action and presents several arguments against them. The review focuses on accuracy in presentation of different causal theories of action and soundness of arguments presented against them by the author. At the end, I discuss some methodological issues raised by the book.
Marcin Drofiszyn
Published: 31 December 2020
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 28, pp 5-23; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0019

Abstract:
The paper presents a relative preference semantics for multimodal logic of good and ought inspired by the axiological writings of Henryk Elzenberg. Its central concept is the act of preference between alternative possibilities performed by a metaempirical will, guided only by pure reasons. In semantics, the act of a metaempirical will is modeled using an orderly relation between possible worlds. Using this logic, I formalize some relationships between good and ought posited by Elzenberg.
Published: 31 December 2020
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 28, pp 61-82; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0023

Abstract:
Recently, it has been claimed that Aristotle’s mechanics is a special case of Newton’s mechanics, adequate for speeds tending to zero (Grygiel 2020). I show in the article that this claim does not stand up to closer scrutiny. But there is a peculiar historical relationship between the two theories. Attempts to reconcile the tenets of Aristotelian mechanics with the results of everyday observations by Greek, Arabic, and Latin commentators led to the addition of the theory of impetus to this mechanics. The theory of impetus, in conjunction with the basic principles of Aristotle’s physics, led to conclusions that shattered the system’s coherence. In the seventeenth century, some of these conclusions were elevated to the rank of independent principles, and after being separated from their sources, they gave rise to the research program of Newtonian mechanics.
Patryk Popławski
Published: 31 December 2020
Filozofia Nauki, Volume 28, pp 39-60; https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0021

Abstract:
This paper discusses the problem of applying Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s method of syntactic analysis to incomplete expressions that occur in natural languages. The author defends the claim that it is impossible effectively to apply syntactic analysis to any expressions of natural languages, due to the presence of incomplete expressions. First, the author outlines the basic concepts and describes Ajdukiewicz’s selected views on incomplete expressions, as well as his method of syntactic analysis. Second, using the example of various types of incomplete expressions, the author presents problems that arise when syntactic analysis is applied to expressions of natural languages.
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