Managerial and Decision Economics

Journal Information
ISSN / EISSN : 0143-6570 / 1099-1468
Current Publisher: Wiley (10.1002)
Total articles ≅ 2,596
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Latest articles in this journal

Viktor Bozhinov, , Katrin Scharfenkamp
Published: 17 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3311

Abstract:
This study investigates gender spillovers from women on supervisory boards to women on management boards in a two‐tier system with employee codetermination. The supervisory board consists of a nominating committee mainly responsible for the appointment of directors in the management board. By combining similarity attraction theory with power theory, we predict that only female shareholder representatives who serve on the nominating committee drive the positive effect on the presence of women on management boards. The results of the correlated random effects models in a sample of 95 German codetermined and publicly listed companies (2009–2016) confirm the predicted relationship.
Published: 16 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3293

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
, Qianyao Xue
Published: 16 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3310

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
Nathan Berg, , Ilgyun Seon
Published: 15 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3295

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
Xiaoqian Fan, , Lin Yang
Published: 12 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3308

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
, Eva Maria Putz
Published: 10 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3290

Abstract:
Recent research shows that in duopolies with strategic delegation, firm owners have an incentive to always share information about managerial compensation contracts. We study how sharing of contract information is affected by the presence of a supplier. We find that under quantity competition, a partial information‐sharing equilibrium may occur. Firms that share contract information punish their managers for sales to soften supplier pricing. Mandating information sharing increases total welfare but decreases consumer surplus. Under price competition, firms always want to share managerial contract information. Finally, firm profits can be higher under price competition than under quantity competition.
Ji‐Hung Choi, Hannah Oh, John Bae,
Published: 10 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3300

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
, Frank Daumann
Published: 7 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3305

Abstract:
The NBA installed the draft mechanism to fairly distribute young amateur players among its franchises. As this policy hinges on appropriate talent evaluation skills of the respective organizations, it can be considered a proxy for decision‐making under uncertainty. Such judgments are prone to fallacies and systemic mistakes. The article found the RSCI rank as a problematic metric, which is the source for systematic draft errors. It can be shown that in many cases, managers do not deviate enough from the pre‐draft rankings of players, leading to systematically over‐ and undervaluing certain groups of talents. This can be described as a decision‐quality‐lowering anchoring bias.
Sabrina Jeworrek,
Published: 2 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3303

Abstract:
We study unethical behavior toward unrelated coworkers as a response to managerial unkindness with two experiments. In our lab experiment, we do not find that subjects who experienced unkindness are more likely to cheat in a subsequent competition against another coworker who simultaneously experienced mistreatment. A subsequent survey experiment suggests that behavior in the lab can be explained by individuals' preferences for norm adherence, because unkind management behavior does not alter the perceived moral appropriateness of cheating. However, having no shared experience of managerial unkindness opens up some moral wiggle room for employees to misbehave at the costs of others.
Mi‐Hee Lim,
Published: 2 February 2021
by Wiley
Managerial and Decision Economics; doi:10.1002/mde.3304

The publisher has not yet granted permission to display this abstract.
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