Refine Search

New Search

Results: 3

(searched for: pmid:27967092)
Save to Scifeed
Page of 1
Articles per Page
by
Show export options
  Select all
, Dechun Huang, Junmin Fang, Bo Wang
Published: 5 August 2020
Complexity, Volume 2020, pp 1-17; https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/9243427

Abstract:
Large-scale engineering projects make tremendous contributions to China’s social and economic development; meanwhile, due to the diversity of stakeholders, the dispersion of time and space, and the complexity of information dissemination, large-scale engineering projects are easy to cause conflicts among stakeholders that affect social stability. The previous studies on stakeholder conflicts of large-scale engineering projects mainly focused on the game model among stakeholders, without considering the influence of stakeholders’ interaction complex networks formed by social relations on the conflict amplification. For the two main stakeholders of the government and the resident that play a key role in China’s large-scale engineering projects, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the main stakeholder conflict amplification and analyzes the evolutionary results of the conflict between the government and the resident in different situations. The small-world network is chosen as the complex network type of the simulation study since it is very similar with the topology of the realistic social network. Based on the NetLogo simulation platform, the stakeholder conflict amplification process of large-scale engineering projects on the small-world network is analyzed, and relevant management measures are proposed to defuse the stakeholder conflict of large-scale engineering projects. By using the evolutionary game model on complex networks, this paper studies the stakeholder conflict on the small-world network, providing reference for stakeholder conflict management of large-scale engineering projects in China.
Balázs Király,
Published: 11 March 2020
Frontiers in Physics, Volume 8; https://doi.org/10.3389/fphy.2020.00059

Abstract:
In evolutionary games, pair interactions are defined by payoff matrices that can be decomposed into four types of orthogonal elementary games that represent fundamentally different interaction situations. The four classes of elementary interactions are formed by games with self- and cross-dependent payoffs, coordination games, and cyclic games. At the level of two-person games, social traps (dilemmas) can not occur for symmetric payoff matrices, which are combinations of coordination games and symmetrically paired self- and cross-dependent components, because individual and common interests coincide in them. In spatial evolutionary games that follow the logit evolutionary dynamics, however, the total payoff is still not maximized at certain noise levels in certain combinations of symmetric components. This phenomenon is similar to the appearance of partially ordered phases in solid state physics, which are stabilized by their higher entropy. In contrast, it is the antisymmetric part of their self- and cross-dependent components that is responsible for the emergence of traditional social dilemmas in games like the two-strategy donation game or the prisoner's dilemma. The general features of these social dilemmas are inherited by n-strategy games in the absence of cyclic components, which would prevent the existence of a potential and thus thermodynamic behavior. Using the mathematical framework of matrix decomposition, we survey the ways in which the interplay of elementary games can lead to a loss of total payoff for a society of selfish players. We describe the general features of different illustrative combinations of elementary games, including a game in which the presence of a cyclic component gives rise to the tragedy of the commons via a paradoxical effect.
, Jacek Miȩkisz
Physical Review E, Volume 98; https://doi.org/10.1103/physreve.98.052301

Abstract:
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modeling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population structures naturally affect sampling such that in a microscopic interpretation of the replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations competing individuals do not interact but do interact in structured populations. In social dilemmas interactions with competitors invariably inhibit cooperation, while limited local interactions in structured populations support cooperation by reducing exploitation through cluster formation. These antagonistic effects of population structures on cooperation affect interpretations and the conclusions depend on the details of the comparison. For example, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure may inhibit cooperation when compared to the replicator dynamics. However, modifying the replicator dynamics to include interactions between competitors lowers the equilibrium frequency of cooperators, which changes the conclusions, and space is invariably beneficial, just as in the prisoner's dilemma. These conclusions are confirmed by comparisons with random-matching models, which mimic population structures but randomly reshuffle individuals to inhibit spatial correlations. Finally, the differences in the dynamics with and without interactions among competing individuals underlie the differences between death-birth and birth-death updating in the spatial Moran process: death-birth updating supports cooperation because competitors tend not to interact whereas they tend to do for birth-death updating and hence cooperators provide direct support to competitors to their own detriment.
Page of 1
Articles per Page
by
Show export options
  Select all
Back to Top Top