Ownership structure and audit quality: the mediating effect of board independence

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to examine the mediating effect of board independence on the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality. Design/methodology/approach The research uses generalized methods of moments regression to test the relationship between ownership structure and audit quality. The sample consists of 162 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council stock markets between the years of 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of the mediating effect, this paper uses the Sobel test. Findings Empirical findings show that companies with higher family ownership are less likely to demand extensive audit services and, as a result, pay lower audit fees. Conversely, this study finds that companies with higher active and passive institutional ownership are more likely to engage high-quality auditors and pay larger audit fees. As for government ownership, it has no significant impact on audit fees. The results also reveal that the negative (positive) effect of family (institutional) ownership on audit quality follows the path through reducing (enhancing) board independence. Further tests are conducted and support the main findings. Practical implications This study has important implications for policymakers and regulators to address the conflict between controlling shareholders and minorities by promoting higher standards of audit quality. The study findings may be useful to investors, assisting them in making better-informed decisions and aids other interested parties in gaining a better understanding of the role played by ownership structure in audit quality. The study also contributes to the strategic board behavior by bringing a new perspective on how boards engage in monitoring by requesting external audit services. This behavior is likely to be influenced by the type of controlling shareholder. Originality/value The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the board composition as a potential mediating variable between ownership structure and audit quality. Moreover, it highlights the issue of improving governance mechanisms.