Sharing managerial contract information in a vertically related market
Open Access
- 10 February 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 42 (4), 1037-1047
- https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3290
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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